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Abstract
General equilibrium theory was criticized for its apparent irrefutabil-
ity, as seemingly implied by the Sonnenschein-Mantel-Debreu theorem.
This view was challenged by Brown and Matzkin (1996), who showed the
existence of testable restrictions on the equilibrium manifold. Brown and
Matzkin, however, maintain the assumption that individual preferences
are invariant (against psychological evidence). I consider the Brown-
Matzkin problem under random preferences: for each proﬁle of endow-
ments one observes a distribution of prices; does there exist a probabil-
ity distribution of preferences that explains the observed distributions of
prices via Walrasian equilibria? I argue that even under random utilities
general equilibrium theory is falsiﬁable.
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11 Introduction:
Does general equilibrium theory constitute scientiﬁc knowledge? According to
a prominent point of view in epistemology, commonly referred to as “falsiﬁca-
tionism”, one can only answer this question by determining whether or not the
theory implies empirical regularities that can be —moreover, that are ex ante
considered likely to be— refuted by real data. The most important defender of
this theory, Karl Popper, argued that scientiﬁc discovery should be attempted
through the following process: (i) the internal consistency of a theory must
be formally checked, to verify that it contains no logical inconsistencies; (ii)
the logical principles of the theory must be distinguished from its empirical
implications; (iii) the theory must be comp a r e dw i t ha l t e r n a t i v ee x i s t i n gt h e o -
retical knowledge that has not been refuted by empirical evidence, in order to
ascertain whether it can explain phenomena that cannot be explained by the
existing knowledge; (iv) ﬁnally, the theory must be submitted to tests of its
empirical implications, in order for it to be corroborated (but not veriﬁed) or
refuted. Interesting tests are those that are “harsh,” in the sense that, ap r i o r i ,
the theory would appear likely to fail them. If a theory fails a test, and there
exists no reasonable excuse that can itself be tested, then the theory should be
abandoned.
For general equilibrium, the developments of Arrow, Debreu and McKenzie
during the Fifties took care of step (i): the principles of the theory were most
clearly presented and their logical consistency was highlighted by their existence
results. The work of Sonnenschein, Mantel and Debreu during the Seventies,
however, led many an economist to believe that the rest of the falsiﬁcationist
process could not be followed for general equilibrium theory, as it was generally
understood that it did not impose any (strong) empirical regularity that could
be refuted with data, unless one observed individual behavior, which is unlikely.
2This generalized understanding that general equilibrium theory was unfal-
siﬁable was problematic from both a scientiﬁc point of view and an economic
policy perspective, as it implied that the foundations of most theoretical de-
velopments in economics and of many economic policy recommendations lacked
scientiﬁc character and could only be believed out of faith in the theory.
Such pessimistic view, however, was challenged in 1996 by Brown and Matzkin,
who exploited an existing tension between the two fundamental concepts of the
theory, namely individual rationality and market clearing, to show that when-
ever individual budgets are observed, the theory imposes nontrivial testable
restrictions on the prices that can arise as Walrasian equilibria, thus showing
that the theory is falsiﬁable even without the observation of individual choices.
The argument of Brown and Matzkin making the case for falsiﬁability of
the theory crucially assumes that individual preferences are invariant and uses
revealed-preference theory in order to argue the existence of data which is incon-
sistent with general equilibrium. This feature of the argument may seem natural
in economics, but opens the door to strong criticism from other disciplines.
From a philosophical standpoint, Krober-Riel (1971) has written that
“...revealed-preference theory tries to leave the problematic relations between
introspectively perceivable preferences and buyer behavior out of consideration:
revealed-preference interprets the observable purchasing acts as ‘revealed pref-
erences’, and only those revealed preferences are accepted as the starting point
for the calculation of demand... It is assumed that the empirical relevance
of demand theory is thereby improved... However if empirical support is re-
quired, revealed-preference theory proves to have as little foundations in reality
as classical theory... The consumer in revealed-preference theory is a ‘deﬁned
individual’, a special kind of homo oeconomicus, whose rationality is presumed
axiomatically... The alleged advantages of increased empirical relevance and
3especially the ‘behavioristic’ point of view of this theory prove to be linguistic
declarations without factual meaning...”
And Hausman (2000) further argued that:
“The notion of ‘revealed preference’ is unclear and should be abandoned.
Defenders of the theory of revealed preference have misinterpreted legitimate
concerns about the testability of economics as the demand that economists
eschew references to (unobservable) subjective states.”
Moreover, a straightforward criticism is evident from the falsiﬁcationist process
itself. What if one ﬁnds a data set to be inconsistent with the general equilib-
rium theory using the test oﬀered by Brown and Matzkin? Is there a reasonable
excuse to explain such failure? The excuse that ﬁrst comes to mind is precisely
that individual preferences are not really invariant. If that is the case, individ-
ual rationality and market clearing may still be consistent with the data. The
question is, then, how reasonable is the assumption of variable preferences? Sig-
niﬁcant research in human behavior seems to have convinced psychologists that
it is indeed very reasonable: in the Fifties, mathematical psychologists launched
a search for a theory where human preferences are probabilistic in nature and,
therefore, so are human behavior and choice.
Luce (1959) ﬁrst wrote that:
“A basic presumption... is that choice is best described as a probabilistic,
not an algebraic phenomenon... The probabilistic philosophy is by now a com-
monplace is much of psychology, but it is a comparatively new and unproven
point of view in utility theory. To be sure, economists when pressed will admit
that the psychologist’s assumption is probably the more accurate, but they have
argued that the resulting simplicity warrants an algebraic idealization.”
Similarly, Block and Marshak (1960) wrote that:
“In interpreting human behavior there is a need to substitute ‘stochastic
4consistency of choices’ for ‘absolute consistency of choices.’ The latter is usually
assumed in economic theory, but is not well supported by experience.”
Accordingly, Luce and Supes (1965) justify the choice of a probabilistic un-
derstanding of human behavior adopted by psychologists by saying that:
“Historically, the algebraic theories were studied ﬁrst, and they have been
used in economics and statistics almost exclusively. The probabilistic ones are
largely the product of psychological thought, forced upon [psychologists] by the
data [they] collect in the laboratory.”
Does allowing for variable preferences imply, again, that general equilibrium
theory is unfalsiﬁable? This paper incorporates the theory of random utility
to the problem of deriving testable implications of general equilibrium theory
without the observation of individual choice. My results show that even under
random preferences the theory imposes nontrivial restrictions on probabilistic
distributions of prices, which are necessary and suﬃcient for them to be consis-
tent with observed proﬁles of individual endowments and general equilibrium.
The paper is organized as follows: in section 2, I give a brief survey of
relevant literature and distinguish the problem dealt with here from problems
and results obtained elsewhere. Section 3 further motivates the problem, by
introducing an example in which I illustrate both the argument of Brown and
Matzkin for inconsistency of data and theory, as well as its criticism from the
point of view of mathematical psychology. Section 4 then lays down the problem
in the speciﬁc way in which it will be dealt with here, and introduces the as-
sumptions that I make. In section 5, I obtain the ﬁrst results, which constitute a
characterization of data that are consistent with general equilibrium under ran-
dom preferences, via the existence of disaggregate variables satisfying necessary
and suﬃcient conditions for their rationalizability as consistent with general
equilibrium. Given that this characterization is mediated by existential quanti-
5ﬁers, it fails to provide the basis for a direct test and it is unclear whether the
null hypothesis of consistency can ever be refuted. Section 6, which introduces
two examples of non-rationalizable data sets illustrating separate dimensions of
the problem, makes the case for refutability, while section 7 provides another
characterization of rationalizability and uses standard results in quantiﬁer elim-
ination to determine the abstract form that restrictions on the data set alone
ought to have.
2 Review of literature:
The ﬁrst study of the problem of falsiﬁability of general equilibrium theory
without observation of individual choices was Sonnenschein (1973), where the
following problem was posed: suppose that one observes a function mapping
prices into quantities of commodities; what conditions must this function sat-
isfy if it is to be the aggregate excess demand function of an exchange economy
under standard assumptions? Well-known necessary conditions are continuity,
homogeneity of degree zero and Walras’ law. The surprising result was that
these very mild conditions exhaust all the restrictions of the theory, as shown
by Mantel (1974) and Debreu (1974): for any function that satisﬁes these three
conditions, there exists an economy, with at least as many consumers as com-
modities, such that, away from zero prices, the function is its aggregate excess
demand function. This result is commonly referred to as the Sonnenschein-
Mantel-Debreu theorem.1
1Mas-Collel (1977) showed that there are no restrictions on the set of equilibrium prices
of an economy, Diewert (1977) showed that there are some restrictions on the derivatives of
the aggregate excess demand and Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis (1980) showed that these
are all the restrictions. A similar result for market demand functions was shown by Diewert
(1977) and Mantel (1977). Andreu proved that a conclusion similar to the Sonnenschein-
Mantel-Debreu applies to ﬁnite subsets of prices. Recently, Chiappori and Ekeland (1999)
showed that the Sonnenschein-Mantel-Debreu extends to the whole market demand function,
under smoothness assumptions. For a recount of the earlier part of this literature, see Shafer
and Sonnenschein (1982).
6The conclusion was formed that if the condition that there are at least as
many consumers as there are commodities is acceptable, then the restrictions
of utility maximization disappear when one does not observe individual choices.
This interpretation was challenged by Brown and Matzkin (1996), who showed
that general equilibrium theory is falsiﬁable, even without observing individual
choices, provided that there exists information about individual budgets. The
novelty of their approach resided in that they did not analyze the aggregate
excess demand function, which from an empirical point of view is inconvenient,
as under the general equilibrium hypothesis it can only be observed precisely
when it vanishes, but focused on the equilibrium manifold, where variations of
individual endowments are accounted for. By varying individual endowments,
B r o w na n dM a t z k i ns h o w e dac o n ﬂict that may arise between the two principles
that constitute the basis of general equilibrium: individual rationality and mar-
ket clearing. Speciﬁcally, they showed an important tension between aggregate
feasibility and individual-wise satisfaction of the axioms of revealed preference,
the ﬁrst of which is necessary condition for market clearing, and the second
of which is equivalent to individual rationality. This tension implied that not
every data set of individual endowments and prices can be rationalized as com-
ing from observations of Walrasian equilibria in an exchange economy under
standard assumptions.
A similar approach, where individual endowments are taken into account,
was taken by Chiappori et al (2002), with the diﬀerence that they consider
the whole of the equilibrium manifold, rather that just some ﬁnite subset of it.
They ﬁnd that “whenever data are available at the individual level, then util-
ity maximization generates very stringent restrictions upon observed behavior,
even if the observed variables are aggregate (e.g. aggregate excess demand or
equilibrium prices).” Furthermore, under the extra assumption that individuals
7have preferences such that income eﬀects do not vanish, they show that all the
restrictions of individual rationality are preserved upon aggregation, since it
is possible to recover individual preferences from the equilibrium manifold (at
least locally), uniquely up to ordinal equivalence. They also show that some
individual level information is necessary for falsiﬁcation, since any smooth man-
ifold can be locally rationalized as resulting from utility maximizing agents,
whenever their number is at least as large as the number of commodities and
redistribution of endowments is allowed.
In this paper, I take the same approach as in Brown and Matzkin (1996),
which requires the observation of only a ﬁnite data set. However, I allow for
random individual preferences, so that even for a given proﬁle of endowments,
equilibrium prices are random in nature. Another paper in which the problem
of falsiﬁability of general equilibrium theory in a nondeterministic environment
is studied is Kubler (2001). There, it is studied whether intertemporal general
equilibrium with incomplete markets imposes restrictions on prices of commodi-
ties and assets, given a stochastic process of dividends and aggregate endow-
ments. It is found that if one restricts individual preferences over the tree of the
economy to be additively-separable, expected-utility preferences, then there do
exist testable restrictions.2
So as to avoid confusion, I will now highlight the diﬀerences between the
problem studied by Kubler and mine. Conceptually, two diﬀerences are clear.
Kubler’s problem is intertemporal, and agents have to make their decisions un-
der uncertainty. The problem I study here, on the other hand, has no intertem-
poral features and although individual preferences are assumed to be random,
my agents never decide under uncertainty.T h a t i s t o s a y t h a t i n s t e a d o f a n
2See, nonetheless, Constantinides and Duﬃe (1996) and Krebs (2001), where it is argued
that further idiosyncratic risk may destroy these restrictions. Other extensions of the Brown-
Matzkin analysis, which are less related to the matters dealt with here are Snyder (1999) and
Carvajal (2002a).
8intertemporal problem with uncertainty, my agents face a set of independent
problems, and at each one of these problems they make their decisions fully
aware of their preferences (which have already realized), and with no consider-
ation for other problems in the set. Besides, Kubler assumes the observation
of a joint stochastic process of prices, aggregate endowments and dividends for
a given event tree and a set of agents, while I, also taking as given the sets
of events of nature and agents, assume a very diﬀerent structure for my data
set: for each one of a set of proﬁles of individual endowments, I assume that
one observes a probability measure on the space of prices. There is no sense
of sequentiality in either the set of endowments or the way in which prices are
observed.
3 Motivation: revealed preference and the ran-
dom utility criticism.
Suppose that one has gathered data on individual endowments and prices for
a two-consumer, two-commodity exchange economy. Suppose that two proﬁles




¢2, have occurred, and that for both of them, the
vectors of prices e p, b p ∈ R2
++ have been observed in the market.3 Figure 1
illustrates the Edgeworth boxes of these endowments and show the budget lines
implied by the vectors of prices. Figure 2 overlaps the previous ﬁgures.
This case embeds the example in Brown and Matzkin (1996) of a non-
rationalizable data set. The argument is straightforward. No strongly concave,
strictly monotone utility function can be consistent with the choices that indi-
vidual 1 would have to be making, given his budgets and the aggregate feasibility
constraint. To see this, consider ﬁgure 3, where the regions of the budget sets of
3The fact that prices have been the same for both endowments is irrelevant for the argu-
m e n t .I tj u s tm a k e st h eﬁgures look simpler.
9individual 1, for the endowment-price combinations (e, b p) and (e0, e p) which are
consistent with the aggregate endowments have been highlighted. If these prices
were equilibria, and hence markets cleared, the demands of individual 1 would
have to be in violation of the Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference (WARP), a
well-known necessary condition for individual rationality. Hence, this data set
is not rationalizable in the Brown-Matzkin context.
To many a mathematical psychologist, this argument would appear unsat-
isfactory, as it relies heavily in the revealed preference paradigm, which gives
the preferences of individuals an absolute, rigid character, something that is
diﬃcult to accept based on observations of human behavior or even on simple
introspection. The assumption that preferences of an individual never change
and are perfectly known by himself, which is very common in economics, is
seldom thought to be realistic in psychology.
In this context, one could, tentatively, argue that there is nothing wrong
with the data that was deemed nonrationalizable in the previous argument. If
one just accepts that there may exist two pairs of preferences (each pair being
composed of a preference relation for each individual,) and that preferences
of individuals may have changed as a result of changes in nature, that one
cannot observe, then there is no objection to arguing that prices e p arise in
both economies when one of the two pairs of preferences is realized, which is
illustrated in the upper panel of ﬁgure 4, whereas prices b p are consistent with
the other pair of preferences, as the lower panel of the ﬁgure. In both panels,
demands that would be consistent with revealed-preference axioms and market
clearing have been highlighted.4
The purpose of this paper is to show that, even under random utility assump-
4For illustration purposes, the budget line of individual 2 for endowments e has been copied
in dashes relative to the origin of the box under e0. This shows that 2 need not violate the
axioms of revealed preferences, whereas from the continuous budget lines it is clear that 1
does not either.
10tions, general equilibrium theory can still be refuted. Of course, the question
of testability is not interesting if whenever an anomaly in the predictions of
a theory is found, the researcher allows herself or himself to explain it as an
unobservable change in the environment to which the theory applies. If that
were the case, any prediction within the algebraic scope of the theory would
be rationalizable, and the testability question would be meaningless. One must
then impose some stability to the environment of the theory. Here, this stabil-
ity will be given by assuming that we observe, for each proﬁle of endowments,
a probability distribution of prices, which must be explained by an invariant
probability distribution over the preferences in a sense that is explained in the
next section.
4 The problem and deﬁnitions:
I assume that there is a ﬁnite set I = {1,...,I} of consumers, and a ﬁnite number,
L ∈ N, of commodities. As usual, for each consumer i ∈ I, the consumption set
is the nonnegative orthant RL
+.
In order to avoid zero-degree homogeneity problems, I normalize prices to lie
in the (L − 1)-dimensional unit simplex, which I denote by S. Since prices are
going to be assumed as random, I assume that S i se n d o w e dw i t haσ-algebra
Ξ. In empirical applications, Ξ is determined by the ﬁnesse with which prices
are discerned.
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one observes a probability measure on the simplex of prices χe : Ξ −→ [0,1].
These elements constitute the whole of the observed data. Intuitively, given a
discernible set of (normalized) prices C ⊆ S, C ∈ Ξ, and given an observed
proﬁle of endowments, e ∈ E,t h en u m b e rχe (C) ∈ [0,1] is to be understood
11as the frequency with which prices were observed to lie in C when endowments
were e.
The question that I want to answer is when data constructed and interpreted
as before are consistent with general equilibrium under random preferences. I
must then ﬁrst specify such deﬁnition of consistency and, in doing so, I must
specify the class of preferences that I am going to allow myself to use when
answering the question. Hence, let U be the family of all continuous, strongly
concave, strictly monotone functions Ui : RL
+ −→ R. Preferences that are
representable by functions in the class U satisfy standard assumptions in eco-
nomics and are useful in that they guarantee existence of general equilibrium,
uniqueness of individual demand and Walras’ law.




is rationalizable if the
observed distributions of prices can be explained as being induced, as equilib-
rium prices, by a probability distribution over the set of proﬁles of preferences,
UI =( U)
I. In this case, however, multiplicity of equilibria poses a serious prob-
lem as there is no reason to expect a one-to-one correspondence between prefer-
ences and Walrasian prices for given endowments. The standard assumption to
make is then that prices are also determined randomly from within the Walras
set of the economy. Since the latter set depends on the proﬁle of endowments,








,s u b j e c t
to the constraint that for each V ∈ P
¡
UI¢
and each C ∈ Ξ,
πe (V,C) > 0= ⇒ (∃U ∈ V)(∃p ∈ C):p ∈ WU,e (1)
where for each e ∈ RL
++ and each U =
¡
Ui¢
i∈I ∈ UI, the set of Walrasian
equilibrium prices is denoted by WU,e.
5For a set Z, I denote by P (Z) its power set, which is the set of all subsets of Z,a n di s
therefore a σ-algebra on Z.
12Intuitively, the ﬁrst condition says that given any observed proﬁle of endow-
ments, e ∈ E, for any discernible set of prices C ∈ Ξ, the observed probability
that prices lie in C is numerically explained by the theoretical joint distribution
of preferences and prices, πe, once all the possible proﬁles of preferences are





however, imposes by itself none of the principles of individual rationality and
market clearing. This is done by the second condition, which requires that,
given endowments e ∈ E, the theoretical joint probability assigned to a set of
proﬁles of preferences V ∈ P
¡
UI¢
and a set of prices C ∈ Ξ be positive only if
for at least one of the proﬁles of preferences in V t h e r ei sap r i c ei nC which is
Walrasian equilibrium given the endowments e.
This, however, demands too little from the rationalization, because it in no
sense requires independence in the random determination of preferences from the
proﬁles of endowments, which one would like to have. In other words, under only
these two conditions it could occur that the theoretical probabilities assigned
to proﬁles of preferences depend on the proﬁle of endowments, which would
appear problematic and unsatisfactory unless one has a theory to explain such
dependence. I then impose this independence condition to the rationalizing
distribution, by requiring that the family (πe)e∈E have a common marginal
distribution over UI. That is to say, by demanding that there exist a probability
measure ϑ : P
¡
Ui¢




e ∈ E, ϑ(V)=πe (V,S), where prices are integrated out. Then, each one of
the conditional distributions πe|U : Ξ −→ [0,1],d e ﬁned, for U ∈ UI such that
ϑ({U}) > 0 and e ∈ E,a s




makes sense on its own right, as they represent “random selectors” over WU,e as
13deﬁned, for example, in Allen (1985). For notational simplicity, let me denote
by z the set of all probability measures on S,d e ﬁned over Ξ.G i v e np r o ﬁles of




¢I a random selector is a function
ϕ ∈ z such that ϕ(Wu,e)=1 .6
In order to distinguish sources of randomness, that is in order to distinguish
randomness in preferences from the one that arises in prices even when prefer-
ences have been determined, I assume that there exists a nonempty and ﬁnite
set, Ω, of “natural” states of the world, which account, only, for changes in the
preferences of individuals. Rationalizability is then deﬁned as:7




is Ω-rationalizable if there exist a prob-
ability measure δ : P (Ω) −→ [0,1],af u n c t i o nu : Ω −→ UI a n daf u n c t i o n











In the deﬁnition, δ is a probability distribution over the states of Nature,
u is a rule that assigns, to each state of Nature, a proﬁle of utilities for the
individuals and ϕ assigns to each proﬁle of utilities which can occur, u(ω),
6This is under the ideal assumption that Wu,e ∈ Ξ. A weaker requirement would be that
(∀C ∈ Ξ):Wu,e ⊆ C =⇒ ϕ(C)=1
Given assumptions that I will introduce below, I can work under the “ideal” assumption.
7Given a function f : X −→ Y and a set Z ⊆ X, f [Z] is the image of Z under f:
f [Z]={y ∈ Yy ∈ Y |(∃x ∈ Z):f (x)=y}
8Notation is somewhat tricky here. Since ϕ maps u[Ω] × E into z, which is a function
space, then, for u ∈ u[Ω] and e ∈ E, ϕ(u,e) ∈ z means that ϕ(u,e) is a function with domain
Ξ and target set [0,1].F o rC ∈ Ξ, the value of this function is ϕ(u,e)(C)
14and each proﬁle of endowments e, a probability distribution over S.T h eﬁrst
condition in the deﬁnition is again that the observed probabilities be explained
by δ, u and ϕ, whereas the second one requires that each distribution over S
have as support the Walras set of its economy, so that it be a bona ﬁde random
selector.
In order to solve the problem, I will consider only the ﬁnite case with fully
ﬁne discernibility of prices. That is, throughout the rest of the paper I will
maintain the assumptions that Ξ = P (S), #E<∞ and9
(∀e ∈ E):# Supp(χe) < ∞∧χe (Supp(χe)) = 1 (5)
where
Supp(χe)={p ∈ S|χe ({p}) > 0} ⊆ RL
++ (6)
That is, I assume that prices can be observed with inﬁnite accuracy, that
only a ﬁnite number of proﬁles of endowments have been observed (as in Brown
and Matzkin, 1996) and that for each observed proﬁle of endowments only a
ﬁnite number of strictly positive prices have been observed to occur.10
5 Rationalizable data sets:
In Brown and Matzkin (1996), given observed endowments and prices, the ex-
istence of unobservable individual preferences was implicitly tested through the
existence of individual demands (for each endowment and price) which were
9The logical connector ‘and’ will be denoted by ∧.T h e s y m b o l ∨ will denote ‘or’, while
¬ will denote negation of a subsequent logical sentence. Parenthesis will be used to clarify
sentences and their quantiﬁcation. The existencial and universal quantiﬁers will be given their
standard notation, ∃ and ∀ respectively.
10Under the null hypothesis of rationalizability, if one restricts U to include only diﬀer-
entiable functions with interior contours, this assumption holds generically on endowments.
This follows, given that Ω is ﬁnite, from Debreu (1970), since demands must in this case be
continuously diﬀerentiable, as shown by Debreu (1972). In this case, only a ﬁnite number
of prices can have positive probability, which I assume by imposing that all the observed
distributions have ﬁnite, and hence discrete, support.
15required to satisfy the Strong Axiom of Revealed Preferences (SARP), Walras’
law and market clearing.
Here, one observes individual endowments e ∈ E, the supports of each of
the distributions of prices given those endowments {Supp(χe) ⊆ S}e∈E,a n d
the actual probabilities that each one of the prices in these supports attains
{χe ({p})}p∈Supp(χe),e∈E (7)
The unobservables whose existence one wants to establish are the proﬁles of
preferences that occur in each state of the world {u(ω)}ω∈Ω, the probability
that each state of the world attains, {δ (ω)}ω∈Ω, and the random selectors given
utilities and endowments {ϕ(u(ω),e)}ω∈Ω,e∈E.
There exists, however, a third class of variables: those that one could observe
under the ideal assumption of being able to access individual-level data, as if
one could use the economy as an experimental laboratory. There are two groups
of data in this set of “observable-but-unobserved” variables. The ﬁrst ones are
the demands of each individual, for each one of the budgets that he has ever
faced, and for each one of the states of nature.11 Second, since for each proﬁle of
individual budgets actual choices depend on ω, then the proﬁles of demands from
those budgets are also random variables. If one had access to individual-level
data, one would know the distributions of these variables. Hence, the probability
distributions of these choices are in this category of observable-but-unobserved.
If these two groups of variables were observed, under the null hypothesis of
consistency with general equilibrium they would have to satisfy certain condi-
tions implied by individual rationality under random preferences and market
clearing. For the ﬁrst group of variables, the necessary and suﬃcient conditions
are that for every individual and given a state of nature, demands must satisfy
11Under the null hypothesis, some of these exercises may be clearly counterfactual.
16SARP across budgets. For the second type of variables, I use the extension of
the Axiom of Stochastic Revealed Preference (ASRP), originally proposed by
McFadden and Richter (1990) and extended by Carvajal (2002b) to the case
of collective choices over not-necessarily-ﬁnite choice sets. Finally, if one could
also observe random selectors, and they were therefore treated as observable-
but-unobserved, then the restrictions of their deﬁnition, namely that they be
probability measures and have supports within the Walras sets, should be im-
posed directly.
Theorems 1 and 2 below characterize rationalizability in terms of existence of
these observable-but-unobserved variables and the aforementioned conditions.
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17and denote by ΣB the σ-algebra generated by ΓBon B. Moreover, denote:






Notation 3 For any set Z ⊆
¡
RL¢I, denote its indicator function by 1Z :
¡









1 if x ∈ Z
0 otherwise
(13)
Using this notation12,t h eﬁrst characterization of rationalizability is given
next. Its importance is that it disentangles all the mechanisms that are present
behind a rationalizable data set.




is Ω-rationalizable only if
• For each i ∈ I,e a c hBi ∈ Bi and each ω ∈ Ω,t h e r ee x i s txi,Bi,ω ∈ RL
+;









then, for each B ∈ B and each C ∈ ΣB there exists gB,C ∈ R+;
• For each ω ∈ Ω,t h e r ee x i s t sdω ∈ R+;
• For each ω ∈ Ω,e a c he ∈ E and each p ∈ Supp(χe),t h e r ee x i s t sfω,e,p ∈ R
which satisfy the following conditions:
12And, also, for any set Z and any K ∈ N ∪ {∞},d e n o t i n gb y{zk}K
k=1
seq
⊆ Z the fact that
{zk}K
k=1 is a sequence deﬁned in Z.






















1,ω / ∈ Bi
K

   

(15)
2. For each i ∈ I,e a c hω ∈ Ω,e a c he ∈ E and each p ∈ Supp(χe):
p · x
i,B(p,e
i),ω = p · ei (16)
3. For each B ∈ B,
gB,B =1 (17)









4. For each K ∈ N and each {Bk,C k}
seq
































ei =⇒ fω,e,p =0 (21)
7. For each ω ∈ Ω and each e ∈ E:









Proof. Suppose that δ : P (Ω) −→ [0,1], u : Ω −→ (U)

















y∈Bi ui (ω)(y) (24)
which one can do since each Bi is nonempty and compact and each ui (ω) is
continuous and strongly concave. Denote:
xi,Bi,ω =a r gm a x
y∈Bi ui (ω)(y) (25)
Then, ∀i ∈ I and ∀ω ∈ Ω, Theorem 2 in Matzkin and Richter (1991),
(b)=⇒(a) implies condition 1, whereas condition 2 follows, by construction,
from the monotonicity of ui (ω).
13The notational proviso of note 8 applies here: ui (ω) is a function mapping RL
+ into R,
which takes the value ui (ω)(y) at y ∈ RL
+.












Condition 3 is immediate, whereas condition 4 follows from theorem 1 in Car-
vajal (2002b).14










































which is condition 5.
Deﬁne ∀ω ∈> Ω, ∀e ∈ E and ∀p ∈ Supp(χe), fω,e,p = ϕ(u(ω),e)({p}).
Also, deﬁne ∀ω ∈ Ω, ∀e ∈ E and ∀p ∈ Supp(χe), fω,e,p = ϕ(u(ω),e)({p}) and








14Since #Ω < ∞, it follows that ∀i ∈ I and ∀Bi ∈ Bi, #Γi,Bi
< ∞, and hence, ∀B ∈ B,
#ΓB < ∞.S i n c e ΣB is the σ-algebra generated by ΓB,i ti st r u et h a t#ΣB < ∞.S i n c e
#E<∞,a n d∀e ∈ E, #Supp(χe) < ∞ then #B < ∞ and therefore condition 1 in Carvajal





i∈I Bi. Alternatively, the result can be argued using theorem 2 in Carvajal (2002b), given
remark 2 there.














follows that ϕ(u(ω),e)({p})=0and, therefore, that fω,e,p =0 , implying
condition 6.
Now, let e ω ∈ Ω and e ∈ E and suppose that de ω > 0 and
P
p∈Supp(χe) fω,e,p 6=
1. By construction, since ϕ(u(e ω),e) ∈ z,i tm u s tb et h a t
X
p∈Supp(χe)
ϕ(u(e ω),e)({p}) < 1 (30)
which implies that ∃C ⊆ S\Supp(χe):ϕ(u(e ω),e)(C) > 0. Then, since δ(e ω)=





> δ(e ω)ϕ(u(e ω),e)(C) (31)
> 0
contradicting the fact that C ⊆ S\Supp(χe).T h i si m p l i e sc o n d i t i o n7.









which is condition 8.
At the risk of being pedantic, let me give intuition about the conditions of
the theorem. Suppose that the null hypothesis of Ω-rationalizability, for some
22set Ω of events, is true. Then,
• For each individual i ∈ I, each budget Bi ∈ Bi,a n de a c hs t a t eo ft h e
world ω ∈ Ω,l e txi,Bi,ω ∈ RL
+ be i’s utility-maximizing demand over Bi
when ω realizes.
• For each individual i ∈ I and each budget Bi ∈ Bi,l e tΓi,Bi
⊆ RL
+
be the collection of (singleton sets of) bundles that constitute i’s utility
maximizing demands over Bi, considering all possible events in Ω.
• For each collective budget B =
Q
i∈I Bi ∈ Bi,l e tΣB be the product





• For each collective budget B =
Q
i∈I Bi ∈ Bi and each set of proﬁles of
bundles C ∈ ΣB,l e tgB,C ∈ R+ be the probability that if each individual
chooses from Bi individually rationally, then the proﬁle of choices lies in
C.
• For each ω ∈ Ω,l e tdω be its probability.
• For each state of the world ω ∈ Ω,e a c hp r o ﬁle of endowments e ∈ E
a n de a c ho b s e r v e dp r i c e( g i v e ne) p ∈ Supp(χe),l e tfω,e,p ∈ R+ be the
probability assigned to price p by the random selector corresponding to e
and the proﬁle of preferences assigned at ω.
Under this interpretation of the variables used in the theorem, the intuition
o fi t sc o n d i t i o n si sa sf o l l o w s :
• Fix an individual i ∈ I and a state of the world ω ∈ Ω.B y d o i n g s o ,
one is also ﬁxing preferences which are represented by ui (ω). Individual
rationality then imposes that the SARP be satisﬁed across all possible
budgets, which is condition 1.
23• Fix an individual i ∈ I,as t a t eo ft h ew o r l dω ∈ Ω and a budget Bi ∈ Bi.
Since i’s preferences in ω are strictly monotonic, Walras’ law must be
satisﬁed, which is condition 2
• Fix a collective budget B ∈ B. Condition 3 is a straightforward ap-
plication of Kolmogorov’s axioms given the deﬁnition of the numbers
{gB,C}C∈ΣB as probabilities.
• Condition 4 is less straightforward. It is an application of the exten-
sion of the Axiom of Stochastic Revealed Preference of McFadden and
Richter (1990) to collective problems as proposed by Carvajal (2002b).
Its intuition is that events that are likely to happen should happen of-
ten. That is, recall that for each (B,C) ∈ B ⊗ Σ,t h en u m b e rgB,C is
the probability that the proﬁle of individually-rational choices from B lies






. Now, for a sequence of collective budgets and collective




⊆ B⊗Σ, consider the event ‘for each k,c h o o s i n g
rationally from Bi
k, individuals determine a proﬁle of choices that lies in
Ck.’ If such an event occurs with “high” probability, in the sense that
the number
PK
k=1 gBk,Ck is “high,” then, it should also be true that for
at least one state of the world ω ∈ Ω it happens that for “many” of the
collective budgets Bk their proﬁle of individually-rational choices lies in












• Condition 5 speciﬁes that, indeed, the probabilities over collective bud-
gets gB,C are explained by the probabilities over states of the world, via
24individual rationality.
• Fix a proﬁle of endowments e ∈ E,a no b s e r v e dp r i c ep ∈ Supp(χe) and a






, does not clear markets, then it cannot be assigned a pos-
itive probability by the random selector at e and the proﬁle of preferences
in ω.T h i si si m p o s e db yc o n d i t i o n6.
• Fix a state of the world ω ∈ Ω. Condition 6 has restricted the supports
of the random selectors to Walras’ sets. Condition 7 simply implies that
they are, indeed, probability distributions.
• Given Ω-rationalizability, probabilities over states of the world and ran-
dom selectors must explain the observed probabilities accurately. This is
precisely condition 8.
If collective budgets and states of the world are fully discriminating in terms
of individual behavior, in the sense that for each state of the world there exists
a budget for which individual behavior would diﬀer from all the rest of states
of the world, then one does not need probabilities both over states of the world
and over collective choices, and just the latter suﬃces for Ω-rationalizability, as
theorem 2 shows. The intuition of its conditions is the same as on theorem 1,
only that by strengthening condition 5 one can now discern probabilities over
states of the world from those over collective choices.





• For each i ∈ I,e a c hBi ∈ Bi and each ω ∈ Ω,t h e r ee x i s txi,Bi,ω ∈ RL
+;









25then, for each B ∈ B and each C ∈ ΣB there exists gB,C ∈ R+;
• For each ω ∈ Ω,e a c he ∈ E and each p ∈ Supp(χe),t h e r ee x i s t sfω,e,p ∈
R+,
which satisfy the following conditions:






















1,ω / ∈ Bi
K

   

(35)
2. For each i ∈ I,e a c hω ∈ Ω,e a c he ∈ E and each p ∈ Supp(χe):
p · x
i,B(p,ei),ω = p · ei (36)
3. For each B ∈ B,
gB,B =1 (37)









4. For each K ∈ N and each {Bk,C k}
seq















(∀ω ∈ Ω)(∃B ∈ B)(∀e ω ∈ Ω\{ω})(∃i ∈ I):xi,Bi,e ω 6= xi,Bi,ω (40)








ei =⇒ fω,e,p =0 (41)





o > 0 (42)













Where B (ω) ∈ B is implicitly deﬁned by






Proof. Given conditions 1 and 2, it follows from theorem 2 in Matzkin and


























gB,C, it follows from condition 3 that γB is a probability measure and then,
from condition 4 and theorem 1 in Carvajal (2002b), that ∃δ : P (Ω) −→ [0,1],












Deﬁne also ∀ω ∈ Ω, B (ω) as
B (ω)=B ∈ B ⇐⇒ (∀e ω ∈ Ω\{ω})(∃i ∈ I):xi,Bi,e ω 6= xi,Bi,ω (49)





































e ω ∈ Ω|(∀i ∈ I):xi,Bi(e ω),ω = xi,Bi(ω),ω
o´
= δ ({ω})
where the last step follows by deﬁnition of B (ω).
28Now, construct ϕ : u[Ω] × E −→ z as follows. Let u ∈ u[Ω] and let
e ∈ E.B y d e ﬁnition and condition 5, #{ω ∈ Ω|u(ω)=u} =1 . Then, let





o > 0,t h e nd e ﬁne ϕ(u,e):Ξ −→ [0,1] as follows:
(∀p ∈ Supp(χe)) : ϕ(u,e)({p})=fωu,e,p
(∀p ∈ S\Supp(χe)) : ϕ(u,e)({p})=0 (52)









o =0 ,t h e nl e tp ∈ Wu,e,w h i c h





1 if p ∈ D
0 otherwise
(53)

















= χe ({p}) (54)
29where I have used condition 8. Hence ∀e ∈ E and ∀C ∈ Ξ :













































where the sixth step follows from the fact that, by condition 7, ∀ω ∈ Ω such
that δ ({ω}) > 0, if p/ ∈ Supp(χe) then ϕ(u(ω),e)({p})=0 .




o > 0 and let e ∈ E.
Suppose that p/ ∈ Wu(ω),e.I f p/ ∈ Supp(χe), it follows by construction that









and hence, from condition 6, one has that
ϕ(u(ω),e)({p})=fω,e,p (57)
=0















is given by construction.
6 Nonrationalizable data sets:
The results of the previous section characterizes rationalizability via the ex-
istence of several unobserved variables satisfying certain conditions. It could
happen, however, that values for those variables satisfying such conditions al-
ways exist, so that the general equilibrium hypothesis is irrefutable. I will show
in section 7 that one can obtain testable conditions purely on the observed data.
However, since I will not obtain these quantiﬁer-free restrictions, but will only
show their existence, the question would still arise of whether or not they are
tautological. I now show examples of nonrationalizable data sets, whose exis-
tence implies that the quantiﬁer-free restrictions are not tautological and that
t h eh y p o t h e s i si sr e f u t a b l e .
There are two types of examples, which correspond to the existence or not
of particular observable-but-unobserved variables. The ﬁrst type of example
h a st od ow i t ht h ei n e x i s t e n c eo fd e m a n ds that satisfy SARP. This case arises
solely from the supports of the observed distributions of prices and its lack of
rationality has nothing to do with the actual probabilities observed therein. I
therefore refer to this case as “Inconsistent Supports.” If this were the only kind
of example, one could suspect that there is a stronger version of the results
of section 5 which does not need to utilize any variables regarding the actual
values of the probabilities and that, therefore, the testable restrictions we are
obtaining are just a relaxation of the ones found by Brown and Matzkin, in
which we allow for #Ω-many instances of SARP per individual instead of just
31one. The second type of example shows that this is not the case, as it shows that
under consistent supports, there are values of the actual probabilities which are
impossible to rationalize. I will refer to this case as “Inconsistent Probabilities.”
The existence of this example implies that the existence clauses for gB,C, dω and
fω,e,p in theorems 1 and 2 were not trivial.
6.1 Inconsistent supports:




¢2 and prices p,p0 ∈ S are
illustrated.
Suppose that the supports of χe and χe0 are given as in ﬁgure 6.
In o ws h o wt h a tf o rn oΩ can these data be Ω-rationalized.
I argue by contradiction. Suppose that for some Ω these data are rational-
izable. Let p ∈ Supp(χe).B y d e ﬁnition, there must exist ω ∈ Ω such that
(δ (ω) > 0 ∧ p ∈ Wu(ω),e).F i x o n e s u c h ω.S i n c e δ (ω) > 0,t h e r em u s te x i s t
p0 ∈ Wu(ω),e0 such that p0 ∈ Supp(χe0). But, then, consider ﬁgure 7, where I
have drawn arbitrary p ∈ Supp(χe) and p0 ∈ Supp(χe0) and have highlighted
the regions of consumer 1’s budget that are feasible given the aggregate endow-
ments and market clearing. Whatever p ∈ Supp(χe) and p0 ∈ Supp(χe0) are,
it is impossible that consumer 1 satisfy the weak axiom of revealed preferences,
and therefore it cannot be that p ∈ Wu(ω),e and p0 ∈ Wu(ω),e0.
Indeed, this example is extreme in that all the prices in Supp(χe) are in-
consistent15 with all the prices in Supp(χe0). Clearly, it suﬃces that there exist
one price in either one of the supports which is inconsistent with all the prices
in the other support. Conversely, if a data set is such that for each price in the
support of the price distribution at given endowments there exists at least one
consistent price in the support of the price distribution at all other observed
15In the sense that, given market clearing, at least one consumer would have to violate the
axioms of revealed preferences and, hence, individual rationality.
32endowments, then there is no ap r i o r ireason to rule out rationalizability. The
next example shows that in such a case the actual values of the probabilities
matter, so that there is no ap r i o r ireason to imply rationalizability either.
6.2 Inconsistent probabilities:
Consider ﬁgure 8, which resembles the example of section 3. That is, suppose
that endowments e and e0 and associated distributions of prices χe and χe0 have
been observed such that Supp(χe)=Supp(χe0)={b p, e p}.
Figure 9 overlaps the previous two ﬁgures. It follows from either section
3 or the remarks at the end of the previous subsection that Supp(χe) and
Supp(χe0) are consistent. Nonetheless, the following claim establishes that not
every arbitrary values of χe0 ({b p}) and χe ({e p}) can be rationalized for given set
of events Ω. The claim is based on ﬁgure 9 and is to apply only for this example.
Claim 1 For every set of events Ω,ad a t as e t{{e,e0},(χe,χ e0)} is Ω-rationalizable
only if χe0 ({b p})+χe ({e p}) > 1.
Proof. Without loss of generality, suppose that {{e,e0},(χe,χ e0)} is Ω-rationalized
by u : Ω −→ U2, δ : P (Ω) −→ [0,1] and ϕ : u(Ω) ×{ e,e0} −→ z such that the
support of δ is Ω.16 Denote:
Ω1 =
©









ω ∈ Ω| b p ∈ Wu(ω),e0 ∧ e p ∈ Wu(ω),e
ª
By SARP, Ω1 ∩ Ω2 = ∅. Now, suppose that ω ∈ Ω\(Ω1 ∪ Ω2). Then,
¬
¡¡




b p ∈ Wu(ω),e ∧ b p ∈ Wu(ω),e0
¢¢
(59)
16That is that ∀ω ∈ Ω, δ ({ω}) > 0. If this is not initially the case, Ω can be trivially



































e p/ ∈ Wu(ω),e ∧ b p/ ∈ Wu(ω),e0
¢
and therefore, given the data set, that
¡













b p ∈ Wu(ω),e ∧ e p ∈ Wu(ω),e0
¢
The second and third possibilities are self-contradictory, whereas the fourth
one is impossible by SARP. Hence,
¡
b p ∈ Wu(ω),e0 ∧ e p ∈ Wu(ω),e
¢
and ω ∈ Ω3.
This proves that Ω1 ∪ Ω2 ∪ Ω3 = Ω.
Suppose now that ω ∈ Ω1\Ω3. Then,
¡

















e p ∈ Wu(ω),e0 ∧ e p ∈ Wu(ω),e ∧ b p/ ∈ Wu(ω),e0 (66)
Moreover, by WARP, since e p ∈ Wu(ω),e0, it follows that
e p ∈ Wu(ω),e0 ∧ e p ∈ Wu(ω),e ∧ b p/ ∈ Wu(ω),e0 ∧ b p/ ∈ Wu(ω),e (67)
which implies that
ϕ(u(ω),e 0)({e p})=1
ϕ(u(ω),e 0)({b p})=0 (68)
ϕ(u(ω),e)({e p})=1
ϕ(u(ω),e)({b p})=0
On the other hand, suppose that ω ∈ Ω2\Ω3. Then,
¡

















b p ∈ Wu(ω),e ∧ b p ∈ Wu(ω),e0 ∧ e p/ ∈ Wu(ω),e (71)
35Again, by WARP, since b p ∈ Wu(ω),e, it follows that






Consider now the case when ω ∈ Ω3.B yd e ﬁnition,
¡
b p ∈ Wu(ω),e0 ∧ e p ∈ Wu(ω),e
¢
whereas, by SARP ¬
¡
e p ∈ Wu(ω),e0 ∧ b p ∈ Wu(ω),e
¢
,w h i c hm e a n st h a t
¡








(ϕ(u(ω),e 0)({b p})=1∧ ϕ(u(ω),e 0)({e p})=0 ) (75)
∨(ϕ(u(ω),e)({e p})=1∧ ϕ(u(ω),e)({b p})=0 )







































































37where the inequality comes from the fact that, as implied by previous results,
∀ω ∈ Ω3,
ϕ(u(ω),e 0)({b p})+ϕ(u(ω),e)({e p}) > 1 (79)
given that
ϕ(u(ω),e 0)({b p})=1∨ ϕ(u(ω),e)({e p})=1 (80)
Hence, probabilities such that χe ({e p})+χe0 ({b p}) < 1 are not rationalizable,
in spite of the consistency of the supports.
7Q u a n t i ﬁer-free testable restrictions:
In this section I show that given the set of states of the world Ω,t h eo b s e r v e d
set of proﬁles of endowments E a n d ,f o re a c ho b s e r v e dp r o ﬁle of endowments
e ∈ E, the set of observed prices Supp(χe), there exist restrictions (free of
existential quantiﬁers) on the values of the probabilities that these observed
prices can take. Moreover, I ﬁnd, in abstract, the general functional form of
these restrictions.
Before obtaining the result, a new and straightforward characterization of
rationalizability is introduced. This characterization may appear notationally,
and perhaps operationally, simpler that the one provided by the results of section
5. To my mind, however, this new characterization is much less interesting by
itself, as it fails to uncover a fundamental feature of the theory of random
preferences, namely the randomness of choices, which was fully done in that
section. That is the reason why I have chosen to defer this new characterization
until now.




is Ω-rationalizable if, and only if,:
38• For each i ∈ I,e a c hBi ∈ Bi and each ω ∈ Ω,t h e r ee x i s txi,Bi,ω ∈ RL
+,
λ
i,Bi,ω ∈ R++ and V i,Bi,ω ∈ R;
• For each ω ∈ Ω,t h e r ee x i s t sdω ∈ R+;
• For each ω ∈ Ω,e a c he ∈ E and each p ∈ Supp(χe),t h e r ee x i s t sfω,e,p ∈
R+;
such that:
1. For each i ∈ I,e a c hω ∈ Ω,e a c he,e e ∈ E,e a c hp ∈ Supp(χe) and each
e p ∈ Supp(χe e),
V









with strict inequality if
x
i,B(e p,e ei),ω 6= x
i,B(p,ei),ω (82)
2. For each i ∈ I,e a c hω ∈ Ω,e a c he ∈ E and each p ∈ Supp(χe),
p · x













ei =⇒ fω,e,p =0 (85)
395. For each ω ∈ Ω and each e ∈ E,









Proof. Necessity: Suppose that δ : P (Ω) −→ [0,1], u : Ω −→ (U)
I and ϕ :















y∈Bi ui (ω)(y) (88)
which one can do since each Bi is nonempty and compact and each ui (ω) is
continuous and strongly concave. Denote:
xi,Bi,ω =a r gm a x
y∈Bi ui (ω)(y) (89)
Then, ∀i ∈ I and ∀ω ∈ Ω, theorem 2 in Matzkin and Richter (1991),
(b)=⇒(c) implies that ∀i ∈ I, ∀Bi ∈ Bi and ∀ω ∈ Ω, ∃λ
i,Bi,ω ∈ R++ and
∃V i,Bi,ω ∈ R that satisfy condition 1, whereas condition 2 follows, by construc-
tion, from the monotonicity of ui (ω).
Let ∀ω ∈ Ω, dω = δ ({ω}).T h ef a c tt h a t∀ω ∈ Ω, dω ∈ R+ and condition 3
follow directly from the fact that δ is a probability measure.
Deﬁne ∀ω ∈ Ω, ∀e ∈ E and ∀p ∈ Supp(χe), fω,e,p = ϕ(u(ω),e)({p}),a n d
17The notational proviso of note 8 applies here: ui (ω) is a function mapping RL
+ into R,
which takes the value ui (ω)(y) at y ∈ RL
+.






















it follows that ϕ(u(ω),e)({p})=0and therefore that fω,e,p =0 , implying
condition 4.
Now, let e ω ∈ Ω and e ∈ E and suppose that de ω > 0 and
P
p∈Supp(χe) fω,e,p 6=
1. By construction, since ϕ(u(e ω),e) ∈ z,i tm u s tb et h a t
X
p∈Supp(χe)
ϕ(u(e ω),e)({p}) < 1 (92)
which implies that ∃C ⊆ S\Supp(χe):ϕ(u(e ω),e)(C) > 0.F i x o n e s u c h C.





> δ(e ω)ϕ(u(e ω),e)(C) (93)
> 0
contradicting the fact that C ⊆ S\Supp(χe).T h i si m p l i e sc o n d i t i o n5.









which is condition 6.
Suﬃciency: By conditions 1 and 2 and theorem 2 in Matzkin and Richter
(1991), (c)=⇒(b), it follows that ∀i ∈ I, ∀ω ∈ Ω, ∃Ui,ω ∈ U such that
(∀e ∈ E)(∀p ∈ Supp(χe)) : x
i,B(p,e
i),ω =a r g m a x
y∈B(p,ei)
Ui,ω (y) (95)




Let S =# Ω ∈ N and denumerate Ω = {ω1,ω2,...,ωS}. Consider the follow-
ing algorithm:
Algorithm 1 Input: Ω
1. s =1 , Θ = ∅.
2. If (∃e ω ∈ Θ):u(e ω)=u(ω),t h e nθ = ∅ a n dg ot o4 .
3. θ = {ωs}
4. Θ = Θ ∪ θ
5. If s = S,t h e ne Ω = Θ and stop.
6. s = s +1a n dg ot o2 .
Output: e Ω
The output of the algorithm, e Ω ⊆ Ω, has the properties that:
³
∀ω,e ω ∈ e Ω
´
: ω 6= e ω =⇒ u(ω) 6= u(e ω) (96)
42³
∀ω ∈ Ω\e Ω
´³
∃e ω ∈ e Ω
´
: u(e ω)=u(ω) (97)
Deﬁne now the function δ : P (Ω) −→ R as follows:
³
∀ω ∈ e Ω
´
: δ ({ω})=dω +
X
e ω∈Ω\e Ω:u(e ω)=u(ω)
de ω
³
∀ω ∈ Ω\e Ω
´
: δ ({ω})=0 (98)




By condition 3 and construction, it follows that δ is a probability measure over
Ω.
Now, deﬁne the function ϕ : u[Ω] × E −→ z as follows. Fix u ∈ u[Ω] and
e ∈ E.B yd e ﬁnition and the second property of e Ω, {ω ∈ Ω|u(ω)=u}∩e Ω 6= ∅.
Let ωu ∈ {ω ∈ Ω|u(ω)=u} ∩ e Ω.B y t h e ﬁrst property of e Ω, ∀e ω ∈ e Ω\{ωu},
u(ω) 6= u, from where
#
³
{ω ∈ Ω|u(ω)=u} ∩ e Ω
´
=1 (99)
and hence ωu can be deﬁned with no ambiguity. If δ ({ωu}) > 0,t h e nd e ﬁne
ϕ(u,e):Ξ −→ [0,1] as:





(∀p ∈ S\Supp(χe)) : ϕ(u,e)({p})=0 (100)








































where the ﬁfth equality follows from condition 5.T h i s a n d t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n
imply that ϕ(u,e) ∈ z. If, alternatively, δ ({p})=0 ,t h e nl e tp ∈ Wu,e,w h i c h





1 if p ∈ C
0 otherwise
(102)
from where it is obvious that ϕ(u,e) ∈ z.




















































where the ﬁf t hs t e pf o l l o w sf r o mt h ep r o p e r t i e so fe Ω and the fact that ∀ω ∈ e Ω,
δ ({ω})=0implies that dω =0 , and the previous to last step follows from
property 6.
Now, ﬁx ω ∈ Ω and e ∈ E. Suppose that for some p ∈ S, ϕ(u(ω),e)({p}) >
0. By the second property of e Ω, ∃e ω ∈ e Ω such that u(e ω)=u(ω).I fδ (e ω)=0 ,
it follows by construction that
p ∈ Wu(e ω),e (104)
= Wu(ω),e
If, on the other hand, δ (e ω) > 0, then, by construction,









and, hence, by construction,
p ∈ Wu(b ω),e
= Wu(e ω),e (107)
= Wu(ω),e










The previous characterization and appendix 9 allow for the following theo-




    
    
−1 if x<0
0 if x =0
1 if x>0
(108)
and − − → sgn : RL −→ {−1,0,1}
L by
− − → sgn(x)=( sgn(xl))
L
l=1 (109)





and for each e ∈ E, Supp(χe) ⊆ S be





























is Ω-rationalizable.19 Ψ is a semialgebraic set.












if, and only, if there exists a vector
ζ =









































                

(112)






Id e n o t e ¡
z1,1,z 1,2,...,z1,B,z 2,1,z 2,2,...,z2,B,...,zA,1,z A,2,...,zA,B
¢
19The notation C 7−→
P
p∈C χe,p means that the function χe : Ξ −→ [0,1] is constructed
as:



























































satisﬁes the following conditions:
(i) ∀i ∈ I, ∀ω ∈ Ω, ∀e,e e ∈ E, ∀p ∈ Supp(χe) and ∀e p ∈ Supp(χe e),


































− − → sgn
³
x







      


                

(119)
48(ii) ∀i ∈ I, ∀ω ∈ Ω, ∀e ∈ E and ∀p ∈ Supp(χe), sgn
³







ω∈Ω dω − 1
¢
=0 .
(iv) ∀ω ∈ Ω, ∀e ∈ E and ∀p ∈ Supp(χe),
















































that satisfy conditions (i) to (vi). By deﬁnition 4, such set is semialgebraic. By
corollary 1, the projection of this set into
Q
e∈E R#Supp(χe), which is precisely
Ψ, is also semialgebraic.
It follows from Arrow and Debreu (1954) that the set Ψ introduced in the
previous theorem need not be empty. The ﬁrst example of section 6 shows that
such set may be empty and, more interestingly, the second example in that





49Then, there do exist testable restrictions on the set Ψ only, and these restrictions
take, in abstract, the form of polynomial inequalities (although they could be
of the form sgn(1) = 0,a ss h o w nb yt h eﬁrst example of nonrationalizability).
8C o n c l u d i n g r e m a r k s :
The goal of this paper has been to argue that general equilibrium theory is
refutable, even without observation of individual choices and allowing individ-
ual preferences to vary randomly. This result goes in line with the ones of
Brown and Matzkin (1996), which showed that the common belief that general
equilibrium theory was unfalsiﬁable, as seemingly implied by the Sonnenschein-
Mantel-Debreu literature of the Seventies, was overly pessimistic. My results,
however, try to overcome the criticism, common in mathematical psychology, of
the assumption of invariant preferences which is implicitly present in the work
of Brown and Matzkin via their application of revealed-preference theory.
I have found that for a given ﬁnite economy, if one observes a ﬁnite set of
proﬁles of individual endowments and, for each one of these proﬁles, a proba-
bility distribution of prices with ﬁnite support is also observed, there exists an
exhaustive set of necessary conditions that have to be satisﬁed for the data to
be consistent with general equilibrium theory, given a set of possible states of
the world and allowing for random determination of individual preferences in
these states of the world. These restrictions were studied here in two instances.
Firstly, a characterization of the condition of consistency of data and theory
was given via the existence of individual contingent demands and of probabilis-
tic distributions of choices and equilibrium prices. Secondly, it was argued that
these existential quantiﬁers can be eliminated, and that the conditions of the
ﬁrst characterization have an equivalent in terms of conditions purely on the
data. These latter conditions were not explicitly obtained, and only their ab-
50stract mathematical form could be determined. However, I have also shown
that they are not vacuous: they constitute a test of the consistency of data and
general equilibrium theory with power to refute this hypothesis.
In the paper I have assumed that as the state of the world changes in-
dividuals realize that their preferences change and choose accordingly. This
accommodates an interpretation of the theory of random choice found in the
literature. An alternative interpretation is that individuals, although endowed
with one preference relation, are unclear about their preferences and act accord-
ingly to their perceptions of these preferences, which depend on the state of the
world. This interpretation can be easily accommodated by my results. However,
in both interpretations, if there are additional hypotheses about how diﬀerent
states of the world aﬀect individual preferences, they need to be incorporated
in the theory, since in my results I allow a very general class of preferences to
be assigned to the individuals at each one of the diﬀerent states of the world.
The conditions found here should continue to be necessary, but my arguments
for suﬃciency may not accommodate these additional hypotheses, and hence
the list of restrictions given here is no longer exhaustive.
9 Appendix: Tarski-Seidenberg quantiﬁer elim-
ination.
Some of the logical statements in the paper contain existential quantiﬁers on
unobserved (and even unobservable) variables of their models. It is convenient to
argue that these quantiﬁers can be eliminated and to obtain as much information
as possible regarding equivalent statements that are free of quantiﬁers. For
this, I used the classical theory of quantiﬁer elimination presented here. This
appendix takes concepts from Mishra (1993).
51Deﬁnition 2 Af u n c t i o nµ : RK −→ R,w h e r eK ∈ N, is a (Real) Multivariate











T h ed e g r e eo ft h em o n o m i a li sdeg(µ)=
PK
k=1 αk.
Deﬁnition 3 Af u n c t i o nρ : RK −→ R,w h e r eK ∈ N,i sa( R e a l )M u l t i -
variate Polynomial if for some M ∈ N, there exist Multivariate Monomials
©











T h ed e g r e eo ft h ep o l y n o m i a li sdeg(ρ)=m a x m∈{1,...,M} {deg(µm)}.
Deﬁnition 4 As e tA ⊆ RK,w h e r eK ∈ N, is a semialgebraic set if it can be














where for each m ∈ {1,...,M}, M ∈ N and each n ∈ {1,...,Nm}, Nm ∈ N,
ρm,n : RK −→ R is a Multivariate Polynomial and sn,m ∈ {−1,0,1}.
Deﬁnition 5 Af u n c t i o nη : A −→ B,w h e r eA ⊆ RKA and B ⊆ RKB are
semialgebraic sets (KA,K B ∈ N), is a semialgebraic map if its graph,
Graph(η)=
©




Theorem 5 (The Tarski-Seidenberg Theorem:) Let A ⊆ RK,w h e r eK ∈ N,b e
52a semialgebraic set and let η : RK −→ RK0




y ∈ RK0¯ ¯ ¯(∃x ∈ A):η(x)=y
o
(129)
is a semialgebraic set.
Proof. This is theorem 8.6.6 in Mishra (1993), pp. 345.
Corollary 1 Let A ⊆ RK1 × RK2,w h e r eK1,K 2 ∈ N, be a semialgebraic set
and let
− →




x ∈ RK1¯ ¯¡
∃y ∈ RK2¢










×RK1 is clearly semialgebraic. Since A is semialgebraic,
it follows from the Tarski-Seidenberg theorem that
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x ∈ RK1¯ ¯¡
∃y ∈ RK2¢
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